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* "British Watchtower Men" refers to a May 18, 1903 address to 
the Johannesburg Municipal Congress by lord Alfred Milner. Speaking 
to an Afrfr..aaner audience of the necessity for not handling the 
'native' and Asiatic labor questions in a crude manner, Milner urged 
the deploynent of a rrore sophisticated, "civilized", and "discrimin-
ating" strategy. Continuing that these (questions) were not rrerely 
local matters, he concluded, "new, I invite your consideration to 
sare wider aspects of these questions to which I have referred. I 
am the man on the watchtower, and the man on the watchtower may see 
further than the rren on the veldt, not in the least because he is a 
better rrian, but because of the irere accident of his topographical 
position." 
(The Milner Papers, 1899-1905, 
Vol. II, Headlam, ed. 1933, 
p. 470.) 
"To make present sacrifices for the sake of the future is an 
essentially human act: a constituent pf the human condition. 
All stories fran all times offer examples. And in this his 
stocy is as old as the first traveller's. To save money for 
the sake of one's family's future was a comerstone of the 
original capitalist ethic, which prescribed it as the duty of 
self-help. There are thousands of 19th-century moral tales 
which illustrate the principle. To make an offering to the 
future, however, presupposes continuity: not necessarily of 
one's own individual interest (the offering may involve the 
sacrifice of one's own life), but of the values in which one 
believes. The sacrifice nCM is offered in the conviction that 
it will be recognizable and receivable in the future. The 
sacrifice, in fact, is to a tradition, whose continuity into 
the future seems assured. The content of the tradition changes: 
a religious belief in God's will, the hopes of a family fortune, 
the destiny of a nation, the necessity of revolution. Yet all 
are grounded in a sense of continuity, and all seek a confinn-
ation in that... The migrant worker sacrifices the present for 
the future under circumstances which oontinually oonfound his 
sense of continuity. Scarcely anything he experiences or 
witnesses confirms the value of his sacrifice. Only when he 
returns to redeem his exchange-units of time will he gain 
acknowledgement for what he was forced to do. Meanwhile, he 
lives in a situation of allrost total unacknc:Mledgarent. 
. He has at least the ccxcpany am support of CCJrq?atriots who are 
also migrants. They may live side by side, but they do not 
live in the sane present -- they cace closest together when 
they talk about the past. To keep faith with his decision, each 
has to picture his own individual future of acknavledgem:mt to 
himself. A"'ld he has to do this countless times every day. Only 
fran this picture can he receive confinnation. And to construct 
the picture he refers to the past. What is characteristic of the 
migrant worker is not that he sacrifices the present for the 
future, but that his condition is such that the value of his present 
sacrifice is denied. This is why his condition resembles ilrprison-
nent." 
. (Berger, Michael, "Migrations 
into Hell") 
) 
INTROIXJCTION 
Qn·Jme 18, 1904, after a thirty-seven day journey, the 2,800 
t' 
ton Tweedadale docked at Durban, South Africa. After inspection 
by a medical team, the ship unloaded its 1,052 passengers. Three 
passengers had died en route and two had left the vessel before it 
1 had left port at Hong Kong. The passengers were escorted by 
officials fran the Foreign I.abor Department and the Natal Police 
to a newly construct-..ed wooden barracks called the Natal Depot. 1\t 
the Depot each person was registered, fingerprinted, asked if he 
had received the advance entered against his name, and finally, if 
he was a willing :inrnigrant. After an evening meal of rice, fish and 
vegetables, the 1,052 men were retumed to the canpound where they 
then awaited the noming and their departure for the 20-hour train 
ride to the Transvaal at Volksrust. June 20th, the train then 
delivered the 1,052 men to the New Canet mine where their contracts 
and medical certificates \vere registered and they were marched off 
to their roans to start work as soon as possible. 
'1hus began a trickle of :inp::,rted Chinese laborers to the South 
African mining industry which would swell in the years 1904-1910 to 
as high a number as 63,453 workers. But hCM and why was Chinese 
labor inported into South Africa? What was the experience of the 
Chinese who cane? "by was the flCM te:aninated? These and others 
are questions to which the folladng paper is addressed. 
'!he 1904 "Chinese coolie112 exper:iroent, conducted jointly by the 
British Colonial office and the Transvaal govemcrent, was a response 
to what was perceived and projected as an acute labor shortage by 
I' 
mining and financial interests in both Britain and Soutlt' Africa. The 
causes of this labor shortage3 were: the dislocation and interruption 
of pi:cx:1uction resultant fran the Anglo-Boer War; the fact that Africans 
during the War had been able to get better paying military-related work 
and then didn't want to retunl to the mines; and finally, the work 
conditions in the mines themselves that made Africans seek other work. 
(It might be this last factor was particularly irrportant in detenning 
the attitudes of Africans at the tine tavards work in the gold mines 
and hence, in detennining their terxlency to avoid work in the mines.) 
'!be death rate in the mines for 1903 was seventy-one per thousand workers. 4 
'!his fact, plus the harshness of the drop in wages for African workers, 5 
was undoubtedly very much on the minds of all African workers at the 
time. 
The acuteness of the labor shortage felt in the post-war years 
was expressed by the Chail:man of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Assoc-
iation (W .N .L.A. or WENEIA) , Mr. F. Perry when in 1902 he spoke to 
the first armual meeting. After a long exposition of the problems 
faced by. recruiters getting "boys" fran regions like Bechuanaland, 
Central Africa and Portuguese Africa, he said: 
At present the mines estimate their imnediate 
requirements at 145,000. That may be said to 
be an outside figure, but you must remember 
that it does not allow for the opening up of new 
properties and deep levels. A great deal of work 
would be started in the course of the next year 
if labor were available which is not allowed for 
at all in that estimate of 145,000. When we get 
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a little further on and ask what will be wanted 
in two or three years' tine, the figures go up 
to 200,000 arrl 300,000."6 
I' 
This saire problem - the shortage of cheap, unorganized labor -- was 
similarly but perhaps, more directly addressed by Mr. Hennen Jennings, 
Chainnan of the Engineers Camrl. ttee of the Chamber of Mines, in 
January, 1903, in a report presented to Mr. Chamberlain, Secretal:y of 
State far the Colonies. He stated: 
We are all in accord in our belief that the native of 
South Africa is an excellent and powerful nruscular 
machine, and if he can be obtained in sufficient 
numbers and induced to renain on the mines for extended 
periods, we do not desire to look further afield; but the 
fact is we are alai:mingly short of the caTq?lerrent required 
to run the existing mines, and it may be well to briefly 
state the reasons which appear to us to explain the present 
oonditions of tlrings. For expansive prosperity, whether 
£ran the aspect of the shareholders in the mines of the 
white atployees thereof, we believe that an· abundant supply 
of cheap labor drawn £ran the colored races is of supreme 
in;?ortance, and without this aid there do not appear to be 
any great potentialities for the shareholder, the white 
mine arployee, or the countcy at large.7 
But it was the W.N.L.A. Chainnan, Mr. Percy, who rrost fully understood 
and articulated the problan of obtaining .labor for the Transvaal in the 
post-war years. In the same 1902 address, continuing his presentation, 
Chainnan Pen:y illustrated how neither increased taxation on South 
African natives nor "the re-introduction of slave:cy or even of syst.e.m-'. 
atic forced labor (except for public works)" ·\\Ould turn the 25,000 labor-
ers "hitherto being obtained into 100,000; especially," he added, "not 
in a year or b«> years"!3 Then after asking the criticalquestion, namely, 
"Hc:M then are we to meet the increased demands of the Rand in the inrced-
iate future?9" Pen:y went on to say that "after renoving the extraneous 
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obstacles" - e.g., Portuguese govemment reluctance to send as many 
lalx>rers to the Rairl as before, given their own increasing plantation 
production - then, could the :imnediate problan of restoration to pre-
1-· 
war econani.c production rates, especially those on the Rahd, ·be net. 
He added, however, 
"But if we so solve the first problan, and if we do 
obtain fran the old sources the native labor required 
to work 6,000 stanps, the second problem remains, that 
is, to provide. sufficiently soon a further great number 
of native laborers for new developrent. It is here 
that these new sources may help us. • • if insl.lllrountable 
obstacles prevent us fran recruiting, or if recruiting 
shc:MS no sign of producing the m.rnbP..rs that will be 
needed, then again we shall be brought to a stop. The 
second problem will confront us as urgently as the 
first confronts us today. Now it is a question of 
obtaining 100,000 native laborers fran the old sources. 
Then it will be a question of· obtaining a second hundred 
thousand fran the new. If it is plain that there is no 
prospect of doing that, you will have to choose between 
restricting the 1eveloprnent of the mines · and obtaining 
labor elsewhere. 10) · (errphasis mine) 
Thus was the die cast and the problan stated. In order to neet the 
strucli.:iral demands of the pre-World War I South African econaey- for a 
larger labor supply, new recruitment methods had to be developed and 
new markets created." 
As events have shown, the ~ese "coolie" experiment was not the 
. first such plan to ananate fran the British Colonial Office, nor would 
it be the last. 
As early as 1876, Mr. J. X. Merriman, Carmissioner of C.rcMl'l Lands 
and Public Works in the Cape Colony, · called for a survey to assess the 
available labor supply: 
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"In the Cape the Govennnent is called on to 'survey 
mankind fran China to Peru' in the hope of creating 
and naintaining a class of cheap laborers who will 
thankfully accept the position of helots and not be 
troubled with the inconvenient ambition of bettering 
their candi tions." 
(Quoted in Van der Horst, Sheila, ·Native 
·Labor in South Africa, Cass, 1971, p.118) 
In 1900 British colonial official:s had planned to arploy Arab and Chinese 
labor in the coal mines of Southem Rhodesia.12 
On May 7, 1903, Governor Milner of the Transvaal Colony telegrarmed 
Viceroy Curzon in India asking for 'at least' 10,000 Indians to work in 
the railways (later this 'W'aS specifically changed to a request for mine 
"WOrkers) of Transvaal and the Urage River Colony. He added that they 
would be repatriated at the end of their engagaoont. CUrzon' s response 
was basically a negative one, raising the question of the treatment of 
Indians who had gone as Wentured servants to Natal and Cape Colony. 
'!his was the beginning of a series of exchanges between CUrzon, I.ondcn 
ard lord Milner, culminating in Curzon' s May 23, 1904 secret note, 
'Indians in the Transvaal' • In this he argued: 
"OUr point of view does not appear to be l.U'lderstcxxl by 
lord Milner. • • the fact is that we are not in the least 
anxious for the Indian to go to the Transvaal at all. 
The relief given to our labor proble.ms is infini te·sm.al ••• 
why should we throw away our solitary pawn* (the danand · 
for "coolie" labor)? ••• I hold nost strongly to the 
opinion that the Goverrnrent of India should decline to 13 take action to pemit (Indian recruitment far the Transvaal). 
*It must be anphasized that Curzon's unwillingness to send Indian 
laborers to the Transvaal was not rcotivated by humanitarian 
concerns. Rather, the "soli tacy pawn" notion reveals his 
intention to use potential Indian labor as a wedge for maximizing 
his (CUrzon's) own :power within British Inperial administration 
circles. Much of the correspondence between CUrzon and Milner 
indicates a strong a::mpetition between the two in terms of 
perfonning their jobs as overseas servants of the British CrCMn. 
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'!bus it was that the Colonial office decided that the topic should be 
.tabled indefinitely. 
But in fact those searching for new sources for labor continued 
I' 
without pause. On May 12, 1903, Gc>vernor Milner sent the following 
telegram to Secretary of State Chamberlain: 
No. 135. Transvaal Chamber of Mines anxious to send 
mission to West Africa viz hinterland of Lagos and 
Nigeria to ascertain whether suitable labor can be 
obtained for mines. In order not to lose time "WOuld 
you agree to mission of inquiry proceeding at once 
with the object (1) of obtaining infonnation (2) if 
infonnation favorable, of bringing back experimental 
batch of, say, 1,000 laborers in conditions to be 
detennined by local authorities?11 14 . 
After consultations with his governor of Lagos, a rronth later 
Chamberlain cabled back that Nigeria was "hopelessly underpopulated 
owing to recent slavery", and that he regretted to say that there was 
no hope of getting labor fran that quarter. 15 Finally it should be 
pointed out that unskilled white labor was experimented with -- if 
only briefly. During 1903, 900 English navvies were enployed in Natal 
in railway construction. At about the sametime, a snaller group of 
Italians were used on the Cape Natal railroad. Both groups were 
tenninated within seven zoonths as too costly. A similar effort was . 
made in the mining sector at the Village Main Reef mine where unskilled 
whites were hired to "WOrk along with natives. The whites were paid the 
astonishing rate of 10 s. a day plus food and lodging, yet never ranained 
in the job for more than a rconth at a tine. During the rronth of 
Septanber 1903 alone the Village Main Reef mine lost over ~3, 000 per 100 
king stanps. The experiment in white unskilled 1a&r was rapidly abandoned. 
But the larger question of white labor on the gold mines is rrore canplex. 
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And though it cannot be fully ~lored in this paper, let us examine 
several critical aspects. 
First, as the accanpanying graphs aptply danonstrate (See appendices 
.. 
D & E), while the total nunber of persons arployed rises dramatically 
after 1902 the proportion of white ercployees ranains· stable £ran the end 
of the Boer War to World War I - roughly a ratio of 1 white to every 8 
non-whites. 
Secondly, whites, other than mine owners - involved in the mining 
industry were basically ercployed in skilled \'x,rker categories. White 
mine workers in South Africa were a classic "labor aristocracy" concerned 
with maintaining an elite status through the mechanism of white skin 
privilege. long before the Chinese experilrent, whites in the mining 
industry had split into two categories: 1) capitalist owners and managers 
am 2) wage earning workers, with the latter group - subjectively - denying 
the historic class relationship between itself and African workers. And, 
objectively, being severed £ran the developrent of any solidenity tendencies 
by facts like white mine worker salaries· increasing 40% by 1919 while the 
real value of African wages decreased during the sane period. Thus, does 
the lNOrking white labor force present a fairly consistent image of a 
daninant (white) group and at the sametime _a subordinate (working) class. 
There are of oourse fluctuations, e.g., a brief period in which white 
wanen are enployed in order to defeat colored clerks, \\'00 1 as an organized 
body, were dananing higher wages. And Frederick Jolmstone has recently 
written an unpublished paper, "Class Conflict of Color Bars in the South 
African Gold Mining Industry, 1910-26", which speaks to other aspects of 
this question. Bet let us nove on to consider rrore basic questions about 
gold.16 
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What was there about the production of gold, what was its econanic 
potential that so much exper.urentation in the procuring of a large pool 
of .cheap labor would be conducted? A central consideration is under-
staooing the role of gold in the nineteenth centw:y world econany (and 
l' 
that of today). For gold and the labor to extract it £rein the rich 
reefs of South Africa was, as the February 10, 1903 Tim:s of I.Dndon 
indicates: 
••• a matter of enorm::>us importance, not merely to .the 
Transvaal and to those interested in the mines but to 
the whole of South Africa. Five-sixths of the exports 
fran South Africa consisted of minerals, and it 
follaved that the nore minerals South Africa could 
export the nore goods she could afford to import and 
the nore business, by the exchange of products, would 
be done -- with advantage to the whole of South Africa 
and to manufacturers and traders in England, the rest 
of the Empire and the wlx>le world.17 
It is important to note in this respect the relationship drawn in con-
tarporai:y accx,unts between the South African gold fields and London. 
For as E. J. Hobsbawm has noted (as have many others), "wndon ••• was 
the real econanic hub of the world, the pound sterling its foundation 
between 1870 and 1913.18 And behind the pound sterling? 'Ihe final 
standard of value during the period of 1814-1914 for all nonetacy 
transactions, local or international, no matter hCM carplex, was gold. 
Gold was (am roaybe still is) "the eternal treasure11 •19 In the nineteenth 
century, and early twentieth, ''official mints coined all gold brought 
to than free of charge; all paper currency was convertible into gold at 
face-value, 20 and the full freedan to ilrport and export gold was an 
essential part of the system, providing equilibrimn between countries ••• 1121 
'!he centrality of gold, historically and presently, to capitalism22 
cannot be minimized. True, its value fluctuates, and owing to different 
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econanic crises canplex steps have been taken to nove away fran gold. 
But the flittering yellCM dust, the lustrous, chanically stable, 
netallic elercent remains an oldtine religion and Karl Marx wrote in 
; ' 
Ka.pita! in 1864: ... 
Capitalist production forever strives to overcare this 
netallic barrier, the material and fantastic barrier 
of wealth and its novements, in proportion as the credit 
system develops, but forever breaks its head on this 
same barrier. 23 . . 
The nost significant econanic di.mansion of South African gold 
production, though, is the fact that consistently it has been a leading, 
if not the key, producer of gold for the \\Orld. In 1899 the Rand produced 
27.6 percent of the world's total output, and in 1903 because of the 
interruption of the Anglo-Boer-War, South African output plunged to 18.8 
percent. But in the following years the rate increased steadily as the 
following table shCMS: 
S.Africa 
OUTPUT OF OOID AS PERCENTAGE OF IDRID 'IOTAI,24 
1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1974 
22.5 26.7 29.8 32.3 32.9 32.2 34.2 66.6 
In order to understand the 1904-1910 Chinese "coolie" experilrent in 
the Rand gold industry sane elaboration about the nature of the gold 
mining process itself is helpful. 25 Today, ore-bearing gold is dug fran 
the depths of the earth at depths between 5,000 to 12,000 feet. Before 
1910 IOOSt mines were about 3,000 feet belCM the surface with a few as much 
as 4,000 feet deep. 
As South African gold is a low-yield grade, approximately 2½ tons of 
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rock must be processed in order to produce one ounce of gold. The process 
of mining involves passing up and down daily at various shifts a virtual 
arrey of underground workers; it involves the vital activity of draining 
~· 
the huge holes created of water and supplying them with air} it involves 
supplying workers with the necessary tools, explosives stores and materials 
and it involves feeding and sheltering (at sare level) the workers employed. 
As one of the Anglo American Corporation engineers recently wrote: 
The way gold occurs in the Witwatersrand geological system --
at considerable depth (in fact the deepest gold mines in the 
world are here), in narrow reefs and in rock which is alloost 
steel-hard -- calls for the use of la"t"ge numbers of manual 
workers. Although the gold mines continue to devote a great 
deal of time and noney to the develoµnent of a irechanical 
mining machine, they have not yet succeeded in perfecting one, 
and the actual operation of mining gold ore remains highly 
labor-intensive.26 (enphasis mine) . 
It was the early realization by lord Milner and others that: a) South 
Africa had enolll'Ous stores of untapped gold; b) that that resource had 
to be am could be exploited rapidly and unrrercifully; and c) that it 
would take an enomous amount of labor to perfoi:rn this task, which led to 
the adoption of the plan to bring in an extra source of labor which ended 
up in being Chinese labor. In a March 1904 letter Milner expressed this 
view as follows: 
It matters enolll'Ously at what pace we get it (the gold) out ••• 
under the actual circumstances we cannot get it out too fast, 
because in any case the supply will last for many years, and 
that being so, the faster we get it the greater is the overspill, 
if I may use that word, over what is in any case necessary to 
ram.merate the capital invested, and it is that over-spill which 
benefits the local camnmity and fills the coffers of the2~tate and can be used for the general advantage of the country. 
One must also recall that we are talking in the context of the recently 
concluded Anglo-Boer War; for the "hidden agenda" which Milner had in mind 
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was that ultimately the "ova-spill" w:,uld go not so IlUlch to the local 
(Boer) camu.mity as to the British settlers and the British arpire. In 
a telegram to Mr. Chamberlain he urged: 
OJr aim should be to get on as fast as possible with all 
recuperative work. This will both keep up the prestige 
of the government, and help to keep in this countcy the 
thousands of splendid and willing British settlers who are 
anxious to find employnent here. Despite the present gush, 
a British population is our only ultimate safeguard, and 
just row we have our pick of the F.rrpire for alrrost every 
industcy as well as for the land. The great thing is to 
restart the ma.chine ••• 28 
And so it was that the machine was cranked back up. At a March 1903 
oonference at Bloemfontein, South Africa, convened to discuss custans and 
railway matters and attended by representatives of all the South African 
Colonies, a resolution was introduced, · and unaninously passed, that: 
The pe:onanent settlement in South Africa of Asiatic races 
would be injurious and should not be permitted; but that, 
if industrial develqnent positively requires it, the 
introduction of unskilled laborers under a system of 
Governnent control only, by which provision is ma.de for 
indenture and repatriatj.on at the tennination thereof, 
should be pennissible.29 
But even while the Bloemfontein Conference was in session, Milner 
and the heads of the mining industcy had instructed Mr. Ross Skinner, 
then-carmi.ssioner for the Chamber of Mines in Califomia, 30 British 
Columbia, the Federated Malay States and China to do the grotmdwork 
necessary to int:>lanent a plan for the inportation of Chinese indentured 
labor. His report an the resources available for the recruitment of 
labor in China was presented to the Milner-led Transvaal administration 
in late October 1903. On December 28th, with the full support of the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines and Mr. Milner, Sir George Farrar introduced 
into the Transvaal legislative Council a draft ordinance for the import-
atial of alien indentured labor. At about the sane tine, the sane text 
was cabled to Mr. Lyttel ton of the Foreign Office. 31 
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One interesting aspect of the 1903 Ordinance which bears inmadiate 
mldersooriDJ is that it was conceived in so broad a fashion as to permit 
future labor needs to be net fran other than the region of China. In 
;• 
the Ordinance, labor is defined as: 
a male person belonging to a non-European race other than 
one of the races indignous to Africa South of 12 degrees 
North of the Equator introduced into this Colony under 
oontract of service; 'unskilled labor' means such labor as 
is·usually perfonred. in this Colony by persons belonging 
to the aboriginal races or tribes of Africa South of the 
F,quator.32 
'!he main provisions of the labor Importation Ordinance are: 
-that no person or organization may import labor under the 
Act without license 
-that indentured ~abor :inp)rted under the Act can only do 
unskilled labor3 and only in the Witwatersrand District 
-no contract be for longer than three years 
-that no laborer under the Act be allaved to remain as a 
pennanent inhabitant, or be enployed in any other capacity 
than that of unskilled mine labor, not be permitted to own 
or lease property, or take out trade licenses or licenses 
for private mining 
-that all laborers cany a prescribed identification passport 
and cannot leave the pranises of acccmrcx:1ation for longer 
than 48 hours 
-that all importers of labor should keep an open register 
of all laborers entering, all deaths, transfers, desertions, 
unlawful absences or offences camnitted by laborers 
-that on the termination of contract either by time, illness, 
unsuitability, refractmy oonduct, the laborer be repatriated 
with the least possible delay 
-that every laborer shall have prooided for hbn six days work 
per week at the rate of one (1) shilling per dian 
-that in order to be paid every laborer must bore a 36 inch 
hole or perfo:cn enough other activities so as to do a "fair 
day's work" 
-that any laborer desiring to tenninate his oontract may at any 
ti..ne do so, on producing the sum necessary to cover his mpor-
tation and repatriation a--penses. 34 
(later, a series of agrearents between mi.pe managers and the Foreign Labor 
Depart:rrent added such regulations as: managers being able to stipulate 
the anount of work required fran each worker each shift with the manager 
acting as judge as to whether or not the anount required had been done. 
Failure to get .the required work done constituted breach of contract -
- 12 -
! 
I 
I 
' 
ari offense punishable by inprisonm:mt.) 
Finally, with the effectualization of the 1903 Ordinance, the Foreign 
Labor Depart:Irent was created (May 19, 1904) • Based in Johannesburg, with 
; ' . 
offices and staff at Durban and the Chinese Treaty Ports, consisting of a 
superintendent, secretary, Chief Inspector and Travelling Inspector, 
· Inspectors, Clerks, arx1 Chinese Orderly Clerks for each of the various 
.-mining regions, the stated purpose of the Foreign Labor Department was to 
create and inplanent the elaborate arrangements necessary for getting 
Chinese labor working in the Rand gold fields, 
without injury to the social structure of the camn.mity 
to its ccmrercial interests, or to the alien laborers 
thansel ves. 35 
In actuality, the Foreign Labor Department represented a clear instance 
of the State intervening to perfo:cm a task that private capital in South 
Africa could not have managed, given the lCM level of developnent of its 
resources at that stage. Within the Foreign Labor Department was gathered 
all the police and military anns of the State, inspectors were military rcen 
with experience in China, the systan of identification of the "coolies" 
introduced by one E. Hemy (ex-Olief Calmissioner of the Iondon Metropolitan 
- Police Force and ex-advisor to the British military forces occupying Johannes-
burg during 1900) had grown out of police work in India and England and was 
an advance upon arry other knCMn methods (no Polaroid ID II cameras then), 
' namely, the fingerprint system. Also involved in the initiation of the 
itrp:)rtation activity was the question of the Transvaal being able to mz?et 
its wartime debt of 830,000,000. Many in the Iq>erial Govermrent felt that 
helping the Transvaal get its labor was the only way to see that in tum Her 
Majesty's Government got its noney. Whether one points to the Emigration 
Convention of 1904, signed by Britain and China, which legitimized the 
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:inportation agreanent between the Transvaal and China, or whether one looks 
at the lengths to which the Foreign Office went to administer the import-
ation of the indentured Chinese, the 1904-10 Chinese "ccx:>lie" experiment is 
I' 
part of oontinual pattern of the process of capitalist develq:rrent in South 
Africa being made possible by State intervention. Or as Martin I.egassick 
recently put it: 
South African capitalism, ••• is characterized by extrane extra-
econanic ooercion of the majority of the labor force ••• appropri-
ation takes place by means of the econanic wage relationship ••• 
as Marx argued in Capital on the length of the working day, the 
state under capitalism reflects the balance of power in the class 
struggle between capital and lbaor, and therefore can extend or 
inhibit the power of capital to appropriate surplus.36 
In June 1904, before the passing of the first Reading of the Labor 
Inq;>artation Ordinance and also before the publication of the Convention 
between the Goverrnnent of the British Enpire and the Chinese Imperial 
Authority, the Labor ~rtation Agency, Ltd., was organized by the 
Johannesburg chapter of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. The Chainnan of 
the . Board of the new agency was none other than Mr. Joseph Perry who also 
was Board Chairnml for the W.N.L.A. and before that had been Jil1?erial · 
Secretary to the High Ccmnissioner for South Africa, Lord Milner. (Add-
. itionally, Perry like all the members of the Transvaal Leg Co, had been 
appointed to that august body by Lord Milner). This particular cx.rnbination 
of personnel arx1 Lord Milner's haste to "get on with it" explains how, after 
a thirty-seven day voyage fran Hong Kong, the SS 'Iweedadale docked in Durban 
with its cargo by the 18th of June. This early June docking and the presence 
of sate 47,217 "coolies" on the Rand with another 2,000 intransit by the end 
of 1905 irrlicate the extent to which the actual process of :importation was 
underway well before a South African Colony legislative decision to :import 
labor had been made. This sequence of events make far less accurate any . 
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historical narratives37 arphasizing the so-called "great controversy" 
raging between Boer yeanam:y and British Colonialists concerning the 
proposed importation of "Asiatic Labor". The reconstruction of events 
;• 
clearly indicates that the Colonial Office and the mining magnets and 
made their decisions long before, and that it would be inp:>sed upon the 
oonquered Boers -- like it or not. The legislative process had only the 
• trappings of authorization. 
The workers who came were initially £ran Southem China {Kwang Fung 
Province) as there was knCM to be a large surplus population in that 
region. But after a severe outbreak of beri-beri in 1904 (which killed 
137 and resulted in 537 being :repatriated as incapacitated) and sane 
delicate diplanatic balancing to keep Southern Chinese reserved as a 
surplus labor force for British Malaysia, the Transvaal Labor Importation 
Agency recruited largely Northern Chinese. This was, in fact, a break 
for the recruiters, as the Russo-Japanese War had closed the border with 
Manchuria which nomally received thousands of Northem Chinese.migrant 
workers. 38 
The stage of developnent in China itself - China in the early 1900's 
being rostly rural agriculture, with sore srcall handicraft industry and 
an even smaller number of industries - made China a riqi source of cheap 
labor for other regions with the industrial structure needing the labor. 
Even as late as 1910, there were "as far as is known, only 4,500 miles 
of railway, 26 cotton mills, and 31 m:xlem flour mills, in the whole country." 38A 
The Chinese were recruited in China by means of the local press 
printing the text of the Contract of Service. British recruiters, assisted 
by Chinese hel~s, licensed by the Transvaal Froigration Act, and repre-
senting specific cxnpanies, wcw.d then process potential laborers at the 
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various depots in China. After signing the contract each man w-ould 
rec:eive a medical examination and an advance sum which was to be left 
with his family. Once having signed the Contract, he could no longer 
I-' 
.. 
leave the Depot. Signed-up, he was photographed and given a metal 
badge with his shipping number on it. Arrangenents could be made at 
that tine to have all or part of his salary periodically telegraphed 
back to his village via the depot in China. (Ultimately, this plan 
was abandoned as wages often did not go beyond the clerks and intenned-
iaries, Chinese and British, back in the Depots). 
The Chinese laborers worked six days per week and were given 
Christmas, Gcx:xi Friday and six different Chinese holidays "off" per year. 
?-bst ( 40%) underground workers were EITg?loyed in hand drilling. Others 
shovelled up rock broken by blasting which in tum had to be hauled to the 
surface. The other major type of underground work was "tramning", i.e., 
the hand pushing of trucks of broken rock along the stopes (horizontal 
tunnels) of the mine to a point in the shaft where it could be hauled 
· to the surface. At no point in the l.mderground work was the temperature 
less than 90 degrees F. with a 90% hunidity rate. Most worked in at 
least knee depth water at all times while underground. There was very 
· little punp equiprent used to renove the water. And the men often waited 
several hours in wet clothing while the skips were being used to transport 
rock to the surface.* Even today, according to the JanUaJ:Y, 1974 National 
Geographic, ~e recruits are taken through harsh, daily four-hour exercises 
. racing up and down steps in a heated roan at double speed in order "to 
build up the tolerance for the heat and hunidity of the depths." 
* See Appendix B, for pneunnnia death rate. 
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Also, as the mine shafts were sunk rcore deeply, because of the mineral 
veins hitting water tables, the anount of water, like the tarperature 
in tre mine increased proportionately. 39 _ Finally, it must be renembered 
I- ' 
that the mine amers' ooncern at that~ was only prof.ft maximization 
through intensive · labor methxls. Investm;mt into capitalization and 
labor-saving machinery would be a post WWII developrent. (Indeed, it is 
· sanething that only ncM are the Pal.cl minecMners seriously embarking upon) • 
Life en the canpounds for the Chinese workers was a harsh entrapnent. 
'!hey were paid one (1) shilling per 10-hour shift. Though legally 
pe.mti.tted to bring their wives, only four Chinese~ ever appeared. 
The Transvaal Encyclo?:fila of Mining (Op. Cit.) reports that little of 
the IOOney earned ever reached China. Rather, it was spent locally either 
through lavish purchasing ("the Chinese not really being thrifty after all") 
or excessive gambling - the "latter vice being deeply rooted in the Chinese 
national character". (p. 540) 
'1he canpounds at Durban, were laid out in a square with kitchen and 
bath facilities inside. There were approximately 15 r~ttes on each 
side of the square, each measuring 38' x 16' and "capable of acc:amodating 
24 to 40 men. 1140 Each roc:rcette was fitted with 40 concrete bunks. The 
bunks averaged 61 an. wide and 2 .1 meters long. The bunk sei:ved both as 
the sleeping area and as the storage area for each worker. The average 
vertical height of each hut depended upon whether it had single-tiered, 
double-tiered or occasionally triple-tiered bunks but in no instance was 
it nore than 14 feet. {It must be pointed out rovever, that this was 
pe.mti.tted to be reduced to 12 feet when in 1904 a camd.ssion was appointed 
to "inquire into the arcount of air space required per head in colored 
ocnp::>Unds" and discovered that the "coolies" needed only 200 cubic feet 
of air space and not 250 11 • 41 The facilities provided at each mine varied 
- 17 -
much nore, were less imraliately under public scrutiny, and constituted 
even nore harsh housing acccm:codations than those at the CCJII>Ounds. 
Food was prepared by a special staff o~. Chinese "coolie-cooks". And 
food and kitchen facilities were pericxlically inspected. Early, it was 
discovered that Northem Chinese could not "consurre anything app.roaching 
the 2½ lbs of rice per dian1142 which has been scheduled for them. Thus, 
the following daily nenu intended for "the inferior class of people" 
. I . . 
the Southemers, was adopted far all: 
1½ lbs. of rice 
½ lb. of vegetables 
½ lb. of dried or fresh fish or rreat 
½ oz. of tea 
½oz.of nut oil 
salt43 
"Hot tea was always available and the quality of the focx:1 supplied and the 
cooking arrangarents were excellent. 11 44 The average cost of feeding a 
"coolie" was only 11 shillings per rronth. And though during that first 
year 469 Chinese died, 45 and 1,;61 were repatriated to China CMing to 
physical infil:mity or disease, lord Sel.borne wrote: 
"It cannot be too widely understcxx:1 that the normal condition of affairs 
on a mine where Chinese are arployed is that of tranquility. 11 46 
Finally, and only if the tranquility was disturbed: 
In the canpounds order is maintained by a CCJTIE.'Ound manager and a 
staff of Chinese police (selected fran anong the coolies at the 
depots in China prior to embarkation and after arrival at Durban). 
Many of these policemen have served in the Chinese ant¥, or under 
British administrations elsewhere".47 
Generally, the conditions of work and living speak of a quality of life that 
is best captured in the selection fran "migrations to hell" which opened 
this paper. 
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The daily routine was dull and nonotonous. A working day was ten 
hours long at the end of which the worker only faaed the activity of 
sleep or sitting around awaiting the next shift. The mining carpanies 
provided no recreational facilities. 
;' 
Finally, the traditional methcx:1 for institutionally confined men 
to release sane frustrations and anxieties - wanen - was not allowed to 
t?he Chinese "coolies" until late in the period. It was 1908, when Voortrekker 
wives' fear of wandering "coolie" deserters had peaked, that the Chinese 
were permitted to go to African brothels - even as far cJ!.lvay as Johnnesburg.* 
And the 49 suicides which occurred in the mining barracks between July 1905 
am June 1906, 48 the incidence of hatosexuality alluded to in the historical 
documentation, 49 both these phenarena and others, like the excessive 
gambling, speak to the heightened sense of alienation and misery felt by the 
Chinese workers at that tine. But is is South African econanist, FraT'lcis 
Wilson, describing the ~es of a nore recent period who best expresses the 
sense of what '"-Urk was like in the mines. . He writes: 
"'lb get sane idea of the working conditions with which th)se actually 
mining the gold have to cope, it is perhaps easiest to start thinking 
of a road laborer digging up a pavanent with a jack hanmer drill. 
Now :imagine him doint that work thousands of feet underground, in 
intense heat, where he cannot even begin to stand upright, and where 
the drill is not going with the aid of gravity into the ground beneath, 
but where it has to be .held horizontal and driven into the wall in 
front. Add to this picture the noise of the road drill magnified 
several times by the confined space; dust ••• which invades the lungs 
and the possibility that the roof of the mine may suddenly cave in 
tmder the pressure, or that the spark fran the drill or a careless 
cigarette might ignite a i;ocket of methane gas, and one has sane idea 
of the work of a 'machine boy' • " 
{Wilson, Labor in the South African 
GolcfMines, 1911-1969, Cambridge Press, 
1972, p.20) 
f-
* Much too little is kncMn about the crucial question, ~ , the 
relationship of wanen to the mining process, their employment 
in and around the canpound. In other situations, copper mining, 
in the southwest of the United States, Phelps-Dodge to be specific, 
mine managarent has transported in waren for the workers' amuserrent -
part of keeping a contented work force. What has been the pattern 
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in South Africa? One can only speculate. sl4 1;, c:h-t C~ o ~ PJNr,z:;:: ~ /{L 7J I~ 'v,) {n)}j f,;Jth. . ti-b~ 
With the departure of the '!weedadale in May 1904, a process was set ~:;;:' v::::;_\ fr< 
11) e,-~ 
in notion, one that has often accanpanied periods of rapid capital accum- 9..,.,. (..,;,~~ . bbf'f · 
f / '1,?1-
mulation and econanic growth with attendanb·dislocation in _~e traditional 
patterns of social relations. 50 It was a process which was, as Mr. James 
Jamieson, Superinterrlent of the Foreign Labor Depart:nent, 1904-06, camented: 
••• a subject of ~t amongst the resident officers conversant 
with the Chinese in their own country that after a few rronths on 
the Rand the "coolies"~ 'de-Otlnese-ed' ••• a sudden uproot-
ing of ancient landmarks defining the path of duty, a relaxation 
of tine-honored canons of behavior, the withdrawal of the collective 
nnral atnospheric pressure brought to bear on the individual fran 
birth by the family, village and camrunity at large, and if after 
a short sojourn here the "coolie" finds that he can afford to 
disregard with impunity prescriptions hitherto considered sacred, it 
is not surprising that he should develop a tendency ta.-Jards 
degeneration. 51 · 
But it was much nore than "a tendency towards degeneration" that marked the 
response of the 50,000 imported Chinese workers to the conditions they 
encountered in South Africa. In the year June 1905 to July 1906, 41,600 
Cti.nese were arployed. 52 In that sane period, thirteen thousand, five 
hundred and thirty-two were coovicted of criminal offenses rangL"'lg fran 
petty thievecy to assault and murder. 53 In that sane period, 8,009 desertions 
were citea. 54 
No doubt assisting the rise in the desertion rate (and bespeaking the 
desperation people felt) was the appearance within the first year of copies 
of a map drawn with Chinese characters which were circulating surreptitiously 
throughout many carp:nmds. The map supposedly sha-.'ed the route for the mine 
workers to retum to China by walkiri.g over land.* 
A final indication of the "ooolies" response to what they ecountered 
was that during the first year of the experim:mt the Transvaal Attozney 
General reported 21,205 cases of unlawful absence. 55 (i.e. being aJNa.Y fran 
the mining premises m:>re than 48 hours) • 
* See 1906 Report on Control of Chinese Indentured I,abqrers • 
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It all anounted to the Chinese workers on the Pand in 1904-06 
rebelling against their conditions. '!he South Africans at the tima 
attributed sane of the crirres to the slovenly, low-life character of 
the type of Chinese being inp:)rted. The desertion rate~ attributed 
to the presence of many garoblers and the fact that those gambling, 
often losing, had to flee for their lives in order to avoid paying the 
debt incurred and "to save face". The 1906 Special Canni.ttee on Control 
of Chinese Indentured Ia.borers concluded that "the causes of the trouble 
did not arise fran the greater restriction put upon the liberty of the 
laborers, but were to be attributed rather to the class of men brought 
to this country. n 56 
Within two nonths after their June, 1904 arrival, the resistance 
activities of the "coolie" laborers began. As of July 1905, 620 Chinese 
were dead because of "crine-related activities". There is a regular 
/ 
pattem of theft, anti-property rioting (i.e., window-breaking, destroying 
living quarters, etc.) , and breaking and entering - damage to property 
that is a standard expression of class rebellion. A m:re glance at sare 
of the entries £ran the List of Riots and Disturbances Arrongst Chinese 
Laborers which Necessitated the calling in of Police Assistance57 during 
the period June 22nd 1904 to July 30, 1905, indicates the fundamental 
eoonanic and political roots to the grievances the Chinese were feeling: 
Nurd::>er Mine 
3 North Randfantein 
20 French Parx1 
(See Appendix I for full list) 
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Date 
29/08/04 
09/04/05 
Ranarks 
Slight misunderstanding 
about the deductions 
made fran "coolies" pay 
Due to a white miner 
(since dismissed) kicking 
over a'boolie's'fcxxl pan 
'!he pattern of white miners roughly handling the "coolies" led to 
such serious retaliation on the part of the Chinese that white miners 
openly expressed "fears of attacks upon them whilst working underground11 • 58 
I'' 
'lllat the at:m:>sphere was clearly present for such antagonism ... is evidenced 
by such white attitudes as that in the following ccmrent fran Superintendent 
Evans of the Foreign Labor Depart:nent (to which Departnent, incidentally, 
the Chinese were expected to tum for the dispensation of justice): 
Non-aCXjllaintance with each other's language naturally renders 
ccmnunication difficult, and with such men, a blow or the 
application of a heavy boot, one naturally thought to be the 
nost efficient means of conveying to a "coolie" an idea of 
what his white boss wants ••• 59 
Between mid-1904 and 1906, the tension continued to build. The "coolies" 
continued to be inported. By May 1906 Martini-Henry rifles fran the 
Colonial Office were being distributed to fanners neighboring mines upon 
request. 60 The May 2nd 1906 Report of the Special Camtl.ttee for Control 
reocmn:mded a cordon sanitaire canprising: wire fences be instituted 
around the pranises of all mines; that roll call be made canpulsoi:y and 
conducted evei:y IOOrning, that European control on the mines be strengthened 
generally as a check on the Chinese mine police and inteJ:preters, and 
"that until such time as proper neasures have been established 
for the control of laborers on the mine ••• men recruited locally 
fran the fanning population, with Zulus or other natives to 
assist, be enlisted in the force for the purpose of can:ying 
out these cordon duties. 11 61 
As special police posts ·were being constructed around the mines having 
Chinese laborers, General Botha cabled directly to ·Her Majesty's Government 
that as a result of "crimes ani outrages by Chinese "coolies", fanns were 
daily being deserted, colored savants trekking oMaY and a nost lam:mtable 
state of unrest - such as not kncMn within the nerory of man - had settled 
in over the whole country11 • 62 
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In the neanwhile in Britain, the issue of the importation of Chinese · 
"slaves" had helped bring about the downfall of a Conservative Party 
government and the December, 1905 anpc::Mellllel1t of a Liberal Party cabinet 
headed by Sir Henry Carrpbell-Bannennan. 
Raniniscent of the nineteenth-century public debates in Britain over 
abolishing slavery, protoganists and antagonists were steadily being created 
as to the Transvaal's iirq;>arting "the Asiatics". Reports caning back of the 
Chinese being wantonly flogged under the condoning eye of lord Milner63 and 
newspaper ccnmentaries, especially the coverage of the Manchester Guardian 
fed the Liberty Party platfonn that the "Transvaal "coolie" experinent" had 
to be ended. Tales of Chinese deserters seizing towns and raping Boer waren -
nost of than "red herrings1164 - fed Conservative Party positions that the 
experiment could continue but .nore police control of the "coolies" and a 
nore decisive support of the Transvaal government was necessary. The 
sheaves of cables between Lyttleton (then SecretaJ::y of State for the Colonies) 
and Milner, arx1 the volurres of Parliamantary Debate provide sane indication 
of the magnitude of the Chinese labor question as a campaign issue. 
Especially the question of a pending independent legislative for the 
· ·Transvaal was pivotal in detenn.i.ng the Chinese labor experiment's future. 
For lord Campbell, once he became Prhne Minister feared, above all, a 
·sensational expos~ of the conditions of the Chinese workers that would 
in turn retard his planning for the Transvaal to itself assume nore of the 
buroen of govermnent. 
(A full investigation of conditions was carried out by barrister 
John Bucknell, legal advisor to the Crown Colony, in the suimer 
of 1906 but its full content were never roade part of eit.rier the 
Public Records or the ParliamentaJ::y Papers). 
Within the half year fran May 1906 until December, the debate about 
the Chinese Labor Experiment was decided~5 And on the public debate lew-1 
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it seatal as if the forces _against the Chinese labor experiment had won 
a decisive victory. 
By the Letters Patent of the Transvaal Constitution (Decanber 6, 
I' 1906) it was detennined that the "Labor Importation Ordinance, 1904" and 
all ordinances, rules, regulations and activities related to then would 
be repealed "and cease to have effect within the Colony", all this to be 
~ accacplished by December 7, 1907. In the end it was only by Act 19 of 
1907, the Indentured Labor Laws Tenporary Continuance Act, passed by the 
Transvaal legislature on August 2nd which pennitted those Chinese then 
present on the Rand to finish out their contracts and prevented the 
"CXX>lie labor experiment" £ran ending with the same flurry and rapidity 
with which it had begun. 
In fact, however, it was a cxmbjnation of ~ key factors which 
tenninated the "coolie" experiment. First, its purpose had been served. 
'!he mines were back at full operation and were drawing once again African 
labor, especially labor fran Mozambique. (Recrui trrent was going nore 
snoothly in Mozambique, also because a jurisdictional dispute between the 
neophyte catpany, the Transvaal Mining Labor ~Y and WENEIA had been 
__ resolved. The latter had obtained a catq?lete IOOnopoly.) In this respect, 
the crisis "had been weathered and the coolie experiment had perfonned 
aan:irably as the necessary Rost:CMiian "take-off stage". 
I 
Secondly, the atnosphere of fear built up in the Transvaal by 1906-07 
was real and substantive. The often-hysterical requests by neighboring 
Voortrekker farmers to get the Chinese out could not be ignored by the 
Transvaal mineowners or the British colonial govennnent. For it was a fear 
hewn not sjnply by the fact of Chinese workers deserting and roaming the 
countryside but also by the 1906-08 Banbatha rebellion in Natal, the 1906 
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Deroraland uprising and the 1908 Herero Revolt in Southwest Africa, 
1906-10, the Macua.Makonde resistances in M:>zambique, the 1905-07 
Maji-Maji uprising in Tanzania, and the 1906-07 Watchta.ver Movanent 
;• 
in Nyasaland. 
Historical-Significance of the "Coolie" Experiment 
I have descri.berl in this paper the irrp:>rtation of indentured 
Chlnese nen to the Transvaal gold mines during the period 1904-1910. 
This effort to garner labor was in the first instance a response to a 
shortage of \ll'lSkilled African labor, not a dirth of labor but an 
insufficient number to keep costs la-, and profits high. Tnere were 
other altematives available. Higher wages might have been offered 
to the "native" workers. That this route was not taken speaks to the 
roots of the historical deteJ::mined white skin privilege66 comerstone· 
of the South African society. So, too, could the mine arployers have 
sought to increase the supply of African labor available by offering 
inproved corrlitions. 67 But this option was not taken up either. 
'!he 1904-10 Chinese labor irrportation experilrent had another basic 
:function to perfo:cn. And that was to so stimulate the econat¥ (i.e., 
boost gold production) as to retain the white skilled artisan FQpulation. 
Especially was lord Milner concemed fran the beginning with the retention 
of the British population. In a 1904 letter to Bishop Hamilton Baynes; 
responding to the Bishop's concem about the Chinese Question he wrote: 
"true, mining is not a healthy trade ••• but the Chinese 
will be well cared for. They can earn here in a fe-, 
· years as much as they could at hane in a lifetime, · and 
will return to their own country with what to them 
appears a canpetency and even \vealth. And this country 
absolutely requires sare extraneous help to get along. 
Without it there will be a white exodus, and that of 
course, neans a British exodus .... To say that Chinese 
labor is a substitution for white labor is quite sinply 
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a lie. But it (the lie) has taken in thousands of people. 
The exact opposite is the truth. Without a substratum 
of colored labor, white labor cannot exist here, and when 
the very rich mines are worked out, the country will 
return to its primitive barrenness - and to the Boer ••• 11 68 
I-' 
The successfulness of this dinension of the Chinese labor . ., experment is 
attested to in the fact that in 1904, 13,027 whites were anployed on 
the mines arx1 by 1910 there were 23,651. 69 In the sane period the 
· European population of the Transvaal is increased by 12,285 people, the 
majority of whan are wcmm, to a total of nearly 425,000. 
It was the securing of an additional source of cheap labor - China -
that made it possible to offer the white workers steadily increasing 
wages throughout the 1904-10 period. And also to establish the practice 
of a two-tiered wage structure - an additional incentive for the white 
settler to ranain in South Africa. 
The 1904-10 Chinese Lalx>r Exper:iment was the nndel for the crystal-
lization of the African migrato:cy labor systan as it is practiced yet 
today. 
Following in its wake would crne the 1913 Natives Land Act (now . 
called the Bantu Land Act No. 27 of 1913) which, in alienating the African 
people fran their land, depriving than of the maans of existence would 
force than into seeking work in the mining, agricultural and later manu-
facturing sector as an unorganized, landless proletariat. The "coolie" 
labor exper:iment was a lesson plan for the bosses of the mining industr.1 
in the systematic oontrol of cheap labor. The creation of a Finger 
Inpression Record Depart::rent in 1906 "established for all natives in 
labor districts ard in the :inmediate neighborhood of those districts" 
was a direct derivative of the Chinese experience. 70 So, too,were measures 
like the arcezxled Master and Servant Laws and the Native Lal:or Regulation 
Act of 1911 which codified the closed canpound idea and made breach of 
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contract a criminal offense. 
As well, the importation of Chinese labor systanatized the conventional 
division between skilled arx1 unskilled labor. (SEE APPENDIX H). Deeply 
threatened by the pro~ct of Chinese laborers., caning who might carpete for 
., 
their jobs, it was the white mine workers who pressed for the identification 
of skilled jobs as available only to whlte workers.* Indeed, it was white 
worker agitation that made it necessacy for Milner in February 1903, to 
hurriedly anend the Labor Importation Ordinance prior to its acceptance by 
the Colonial Office. And it was this very 1903 categorizL-ig of labor which 
was part of the foundation store for the job reservation systan practiced in 
South Africa today. And finally resulted in a custanary pattern turning into 
a legal job color bar, narrely the 1911 Regulations of the Mines and Works Act 
(later incorporated into the 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act). 
A FINAL NOrE -
The Republic of South Africa faces today an acute labor shortage in the 
gold mines. 71 The Rand gold mines are operating at 72 percent of their capacity. 
And in sane mines the labor force has been reduced by over 50 percent. Mozambique 
and Malawi have usually provided the bulk of the manpower. Malawi, since the 
April 1974 crash of the WENEIA transport plane (which killed 77 Malawian workers) 
has refused to send any nore miners to South Africa - at least via the WENELA 
recrui tlrent route. The Chamber of Mines and South African government are also 
greatly worried about the possible withdraw! of 100,000 plus r.t:>zambiquian mine 
\\Urkers once the Frelino-led governirent of that country attains independence on 
June 25th this year. If Frelino and the incaning Mozambiquian government decide 
72 
to .halt the nearly 100 year old flow of the Mozambiquian peasantcy to the 
gold mines it would further aggravate the situation. 
1cThi.s initiative was part of a gradual destruction of the white South 
African wor~er•s consciousness of himself as an exploited class, hence 
the destruction of any chance for solidMu.7ty struggles with his African 
c:o-worker. This one must add, however, is not an irreversible historical 
process. 
- 27 -
The major reason for the labor shortage in South Africa's gold73 mines, 
~, is not Frelim::>'s defeat of Portuguese colonialism. Rather, it is 
. . 74 . th the continuum of labor uprisings that have been going on for e last 
;• 
tw::> years in the mines. In that period, as evidenced by at ··least 80 persons 
killed and well over 100,00075 involved in strikes, riots, work stoppages, 
am walk-outs, it is unmistakeably the case, as the Financial Times (Iondon) 
:recently wrote, that: 
"What used to be a stable labor situation has been transfonrro 
into an inflarmable one with violence likely to break out any-
where and, unlike lightning, perfectly capable of strking nore 
than once in the sarre place. 11 76 
. In a manner which raninds one of their "kith and kin" of the early 
twentieth centw:y, the white "labor aristocracy" of South African mining 
has further deepened the present crisis by threatening to strike if any 
~essions are made penni.tting blacks to do mine work previously limited 
to whites. At the same t:iloo loosening up the job reservation policy and 
hiking up African wages are the only way the mining £inns (and other indus-
trial concerns, too) are going to be able to attract African lal:x:>r. Espec-
ially as now they are nore and nore forced to search _their own South African 
lands for labor no longer available fran places like ex-Portuguese Africa. 
The situation then has beccrce one which is necessitating a sarewhat 
novel approach. And sare of the paraneters of that approach can already be 
identified. First, South Africa is turning to Rhcxlesia. For the first tine 
South Africa is turning to her white-ruled neighbor to the north to draw labor 
£ran there. And ultimately as many as 50,000 black Rhodesians (Z:ilnbabweans) 
nay migrate southwards to the Transvaal mines. (Needless to say, the tum 
to a new source of labor is a pattern which by nCM is familiar to the reader). 
'lbere is an added twist, however, and that is a very upgraded pay scale (up 
to five ~s as much as is available for Zimbabwean miners in their avn 
cnmb:y) • This is being done by the Chamber of Mines, I might suggest, in an 
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attarpt to anticipate a politically indepetident, black-run Rhodesia, but 
one in which, as part of a continued econanic dependency, there ·would be 
77 
a heavy flCM of Zimbabwean labor southwards to Afrikanerdan. 
A second aspect of the approach ncM being adopted by tne South African 
leadership as a response to the labor p:roblan is a tum to capital-intensive 
nethods. With the support of U.S., West Gennan, and especially Japanese 
1oreign investmmt, South Africa is looking for labor-saving mac..l-dnecy which 
will reduce her dependency on "foreign", "native", or "foreign native" labor. 
The 
-~~~~'-i----:-1~'-~v tr---:i~'lf-:!- -
the 
ground \«>rk force c .. .. .. , .. 
But the key catp0nent in this new strategy will be a la Hen:cy Kissinger, 
detente. There will be an intensification of the outward looking policy and 
the make-na, friends78 games (in this countries like Liberia79 ~d Senegal 
will play key roles) • This will be aocacpanied by an effort to project 
South Africa as gradually and calmly (in contrast to AJ:1Jola) solving ail of 
its racial problans. And both of the al:x>ve will be the ~ fugue to a 
very serious attenpt. to isolate the radical forces in Southern Africa, 
especially a Frelino-led it>zambique. * 
A Personal and Concluding Note -
'!here is just as with Kissinger's planning for Southeast Asia, a major 
flaw in the strategy. Nanely that, as with the Chinese experiment, there 
* In this latter categocy of activities, the military support of the 
U.S.A. will be especially called upon. This we already see in tenns 
of the Diego Garcia developnents, Pentagon,.;,.SouthAfrica ties, and ·the 
effort to create a Southern Atlantic branch of NA'IO - key partners 
in which would be Brazil and South Africa. 
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are internal contradictions resolving ther.selves m South Africa that cannot 
be sidestepped by extemal treaty-making. The 57,000 Chinese workers 
ultimately resisted against caiditions. Enough is not nCM known to say 
-~ 
definitely, but it could be tentatively posed that the pattern of uprisings 
reveals a growing econanic and political oonsciousness am::mgst the inp)rted 
Chinese IDrkers. (SEE APPENDIX I) • It was not m the fonn of direct · 
. 
militacy struggle. But manifested itself in other ways. Let Heru:y and 
Joharmes Balthazar tum to aboriginal labor fran Australia for relief. The 
oonsciousness of African workers inside South Africa will continue to grcM. 
So, too, will their resistance. 
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Estimated Gold Production of the World since 1887, and 
Proportion produced hrSouth Africa 
kilograms fine South Africa kilograms flne South Africa 
Year 1000 Percentage Year 1000 Percentage 
1887 159,4 0,8 1931 696,9 48,6 
1888 166,7 4,2 1932 755,8 47,6 
1889 186,1 5,9 1933 788,0 43,5 
1890 178,0 7,7 1934 849,0 38,4 
1891 190,0 11,3 1935 921,4 36,4 
1892 220,9 15,1 1936 1 031,2 34,2 
1893 237,0 15,7 1937 1~.1 33,5 
1894 272,7 20,6 1938 1163,6 32,5 
1895 299,3 . 21,0 1939 1 188, 1 33,6 
1896 304,2 20,7 1940 1 251,7 · 34,9 
1897 355,1 24,0 1941 1 226,6 36,5 
1898 431,6 27,6 1942 1 086,7 40,4 
1899 466,9 24,2 1943 830,3 48,0 
1900 383,9 2,8} S.A. 1944 745,2 51,3 
1901 395,1 - 2,0 War 1945 716,7 53,1 
1902 449,7 11,9 Period 1946 731,1 50,7 
1903 493,1 18,7 1947 742,3 46,9 
1904 522,7 22,4 1948 776,3 46,4 
1905 571,5 26,7 1949 774,0 45,2 
1906 604,8 29,8 1950 826,9 43,9 
1907 621,4 32,3 1951 ~ .s 44,5 
1908 666,4 32,9 1952 823,8 44,6 
1909 683,0 32,2 •1953 762,0 48,7 
1910 685,0 34,2 1954 8)6,6 51,1 
1911 696,3 · 36,7 1955 846,0 53,7 
1912 702,3 . 40,3 1956 800,2 56,2 
1913 702,3 39,0 1957 917,6 57,7 
1914 672,1 38,9 1958 951,8 57,7 
1915 700,1 39,9 1959 1 020,2 61,2 
191& - 683,7 42,3 1960 . 1 066,8 62,3 
1917 631,2 44,9 1961 1104,2 64,6 
1918 576,6 45,4 1962 1169,5 67,8 
1919 539,4 48,0 1963 1 213,6 70,3 
1920 500,1 50,7 1964 1 247,3 72,6 
19'11 495,8 51,0 1965 1 281,5 74,1 
1922 478,9 45,5 1966 1 284,6 74,8 
1923 552,9 51,5 t1967 1 237,9 76,7 
1924 583,6 51,0 t1968 1 247,3 77,5 
1925 583,4 51,2 t1969 1 250,4 77,8 
192& 595,7 52,0 t1970 1 275,2 78,4 
1927 594,7 52,9 t1971 1 231,7 79,3 
1928 590,3 54,6 t1972 1153,9 78,8 
t1973 1 101,1 77,4 
19'29 600,3 53,9 
1930 650,3 51,3 
•Aa from 1963 figures exclude U.S.S.R. 
fEstimateci o, provisional figure. 
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tABLE 12 
GOLDOllTPUTOFTHE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE• 
1184-1965 
. . 
- ~·-· - ·-- --- -- . 
Fine Gold Realized Fine Gold Realized 
Ounces Value Ounces Value 
Year (000) (£000) Year (000) (£000) 
--
... 
-- - -
·-
1184 2-4 10·1 1926 9,954 ·8 42,285 ·1 
1885 1·4 6-0 1927 10,122·5 42,997·5 
1886 8·2 34 ·7 1928 10,354 ·2 43,981 ·7 
1887 39·9 169·4 1929 10,412 ·3 44,228 ·7 
1888 "227 ·7 967-4 1930 10,716·3 45,520 ·1 
1889 350-9 1,490-6 1931 10,877-7 46,205-6 
1190· 440·1 1,869-6 1932 11,557-9 49,772-9 
1191 688◄ 2,924·3 1933 11 ,012·3 68,678-0 
1192 1,069·1 4,541 ·1 1934 10,479·2 · 72,313-9 
1m 1,290·2 5,480·5 1935 10,773-0 76,526·1 
1194 1,805-0 7,667·1 1936 11 ,335 ·1 79,498·2 
1195 2,017 ◄ 8,569-6 1937 11,734 ·5 82,556·5 
1196 2,025 ·5 8,603 ·8 1938 12,161 ·4 86,669·5 
1897 2,743 ·5 11 ,1553 ·7 '939 12,821 ·1 99,554 ·8 
1198 3,823◄ 16,240-6 1940 14,046·5 117,990-6 
1199 3,637-7 15,452-0 1941 14,406·8 121,016·8 
1900 348·8 1,481 ◄ 1942 14,126·3 118,660·8 
1I01 258-0 1,096-0 1943 12,804·3 · 107,556·3 
1902 1,718-9 7,301 ·5 IM4 12,279-6 103,148-9 
1903 2,972-9 12,628-0 1945 12,224 ·2 105,281 ·1 
1,904 3,773·5 16,028-9 1946 11 ,927-0 102 ,870 ◄ 
1905 4,909·5 20 , 854 ◄ 1947 11,200·3 96,602·3 
1906 5,792 ·8 24,606·3 1948 11 ,584 ·7 99,917·8 
1I07 6,450·7 27,401-0 1949 11 ,705-0 114 ,864 ◄ ,. 7,056 ·3 29,973·1 1950 11 ,663-6 144,774·1 
1909 7,295 ·1 30,987-6 1951 11 , 516 ◄ 142,947-9 
1110 7,527 ·1 31,973·1 1952 11 ,818 ·7 147,130·8 
,.,1 8,249 ·5 35,041 ·5 1SS1, 11 ,940-6 147,565-0 
1112 9,107 ·5 38,686 ·2 1954 13,237·1 164,675 ·2 
1t13 8,798 ·3 37,372,9 1955 14 ,601 ◄ 182,745 ·2 
1t14 8,394·3 35,656 ·8 1956 15,896.,7 198,499·5 
.1915 9,093-9 38,628-4 1957 17,030·7 212;584-9 
1911 9,296-6 39,489·5 1951 17 ,656◄ 220,024-6 
1917 9,018·1 38,306 ◄ 1959 20,065 ·5 250,135 ·7 
1111 8,418 ·3 35,758-6 1960 21 ,382-6 268,003·5 
lt1t 8,331 ·3 39,277-9 1961 22,941 ◄ 287,447-9 
1m 8,158·2 45,604 ·5 1962 25,491-9 318,290·2 
1121 8,128·7 43,420·7 1963 27,431-9 343,156-0 
1122 '7,009-8 32,343 ·1 1964 29,111 ·5 365,244 ·8 
1123 9,148-8 41,573-6 1965 30,553·9 383,274-6 
1824 9,574-9 44,738 ·8 - · 
1125 9,597-6 40,767 ·9 Total 781,557 ·7 6,621,877-0 
--
-
--- - - -
• Adapted from a table compiled on the basis of Government source's of information 
by 'the Statistical Department of the Chamber of Mines ; includes! output of non-
members of the Chamber. It should be noted that by 1945 only about 73 per cent of 
gold output was from mines which had come into existence before 1932 ; by 1965 
this had•fallen to about 13 per cent. Moreover in 1965 about 70 per cent of the output 
came from mines established after 1946. 
-------
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I. CATmORIES OF _J;A.BC):R _NCYr AVAriABLE 'ID IND~ ALIEN 
MINE. IABORERS 
:Amalgarcator, ·assayer, .blacksmith, bpilennaker, brassfinisher, brass-
m:>ulder, brickmaker, overseer, bricklayer, banksrran, carpenter, coppersmith, 
· . clerk; cyanide shiftsman, drill sharpener, driver of air or steam winch, 
· 'dri vei; · of ·rrechanical or electrical machinery, engineer, -electrician, engine 
dri~, fitter, !ireman-overseer, gauger, irornroulder, joiner, fCline storeman, 
nechanic, machinist, millwright, machine sawyer, mason, mine ·overseer, machine 
rockdriller, mine carpenter, miller, overseer in any capacity other than the 
.. · management' and control of laborers, onsetter, pa:ttenunaker, plumber, painter, , 
plasterer, pipeman, purcpnan, platelayer, quarryman overseer, rigger, stonecutter, 
signaller, skipnari, sarrpler, turner, -tinsmith, timbennan, ~eeper, wiresplicer, 
woodworking machinist • 
. . 'i 
' . Source: ·Transvaal Labor Importation Ordinance (1903) 
I 
II. LIST OF MINES EMPIDYING CHINESE IAOORERS AS OF END OF 
MAY, 1906 
. . 
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I; Mint. i.•11mbrr o/ 1 : Q,oup, (,'oolitl, _! f I · l ______ __, ______ •. f 
! I {Ani:clo Ocihl•mlnl111t Co .• J,td. • •• 
J•~nat. llnncl l'roprictary llllnc1, Ltd, • ~cw Co!nd Clolil-111l~1h11t Co., Ltd. 
C:1~011 liohl•ml11i11f{ Cu .• Ltd, •• 
Uccluhl l'roprlrtnrr Clohl•mlnlns:t Co., r,M. · (ic1lultl J'n•pl'ictur)' Mlnrs, Lt<I. • • 
Ucnunl Tllinini: 111111 Flnnnro (.'11r11oratlon, l Vnn Hyn l•:HI alu 111111 Uold Mince, Ltd, 
htt1. (rnllkrn ll'fllon) H11111I Colll111h·H, 1,111. . • , , 
l•lllo (Wl'th•rn Accllou> Aurorn W1·HI, 111111-c<l <10H•111l11h11t 
, <'11., l,ltl, .. .. •• , 
Jl1111,U1111Mn l~•t-11tt't Oold•mlnlnir Co,, Ltd, North Jt11111lr1111h1l11 Uold•mlnlna Co., 
~fl\Y KMnronteln Co., Ltd. 
Ct.111,ioli1l:it<-d Lnn1?llln1?to )llnr.ll. Ltd. 
1>11rha11 lloodrpoort Deep, Ltd, .. 
,1o·••·111'11 11:rn(I (:ol<l·minl1111 ~-, Ltd. 
lllr11 111•1·11, Ltd. • • • , , , 
lll'11l1•11h11i~ Jlcrp, Lttl. , , • • ' 
Jkur_v S1,11ue Uohl·mlnlng Co,. Ltd, 
,I 111,qll'r" l>ccp, Ltd... . . 
Jni,ifrt 1:1,ld•111lnin1? Co., Ltd • . 
l.11111·:ii•lrr 1lold-mi11i111? Co .. Ltd. 
~1 .. ,1,11-, r1111I rin Extrnsion. J.td. • • • • · 
1'-,•11· M111ld•·rfontrin Goltl•mlnlnit Co., Ltd. 
N1•,1· llr•riul lloh.l·mlnl11t: Co., Ltd, •• 
N1•1,· Jll<·lfontrin Uold•minl1111 Co., Ltd.,, 
N1111r~,~ l lrrp. Ltd, • • • • , • , , . 
l'1'iur1·~" E,tnte 1111d G0ld•111lnl11i.r Co., Ltd, 
11•"""•,'<'ort liC'ld•111inl11g Co., Ltd, 
lt"M" . 1,•r,,, l,td, • • • . • • 
l'il1111111•r ,\" Jn,·k 1'roprlrt,:1ry Jillnn. Lt.cl, 
:-lh111111·r ,\· Jnrk J-:1111, Ltd. 
M1111th Nnunr, I.Ii.I. . • • • 
Roni It II,,~,• J h~t'I'• T,td, , , •, 
/i1111lh t:1•hh•11h11i, l11·c11. T,td, 
1'111l11r t111hl•111l11l111t l'n .. I.tel. , • 
Y1111 11,•I( 1•ro1•ril'lnr)' Mhtl'I, Ltd. 
''llh11!1• IIC'l'I'• J.1,1, •, , • •, 
\\'1h,11li·1~r,1111I tl11hl-111l11l111 C'tt,, J,tll, 
. Wll\\11h•ttrl\llll lh•,•11, 1.111. '. 
Ltt1. • • . • ,, 
{
I\.lcl11{011lcl11 Jlocp, Ltd. ·.. · .. l 
Denon1 Oold•111l11lna Co., Ltd, •• , 
llauci Klipluntcin Co,. Ltd.. · • , ., 
. . • . . . 
2,100 
l,U21 
(No fucr<l number), 
HO 
1106 
400 
. . 207 
1,802 
8.lH 
1,83' 
810 
2,122 
1,875 
1. ,100 
1.2r,s 
1,377 
CiH 
1,0!0 
(No flxctl number). • 
1.200 
(No flxctl number>, 
(No nxccl numbor). 
1,070 
1,:100 
•IOO 
. 1,~o, 
4,·&o2 
1,105 
. 2'2 
(No fixed number), 
2:\4 
(No fixed numhn). 
Cr,; o llxccl numbcrl, (No llxc1l numbcrl, 
¥,llOt · 
IS,167 
Source:- The Encyclopedic History of the Transvaal (1906) 
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